Near Gettysburg in Adams County, Pennsylvania — The American Northeast (Mid-Atlantic)
Headquarters of Brigadier General Henry Hunt
Henry J. Hunt
Chief of Artillery
Army of the Potomac
Erected 1913 by Gettysburg National Military Park Commission.
Location. 39° 48.817′ N, 77° 13.907′ W. Marker is near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in Adams County. Marker is on Taneytown Road (State Highway 134), on the right when traveling south. Touch for map. Located south of the Leister House (Meade's Headquarters) in Gettysburg National Military Park. Marker is in this post office area: Gettysburg PA 17325, United States of America.
Other nearby markers. At least 8 other markers are within walking distance of this marker. Lydia Leister Farm (about 300 feet away, measured in a direct line); Headquarters of Major General George G. Meade (about 300 feet away); 93rd New York Infantry (about 400 feet away); Companies E and I (about 400 feet away); Oneida New York Cavalry (about 400 feet away); Eighth U.S. Infantry (about 400 feet away); 2d Pennsylvania Cavalry (about 600 feet away); 6th Independent Battery, New York Artillery (about 700 feet away). Touch for a list and map of all markers in Gettysburg.
Also see . . . Reports of Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt. General Hunt provided
Of these 320 guns, 142 were light 12-pounders, 106 3-inch guns, 6 20-pounders, 60 10-pounder Parrott guns, and a battery of 4 James rifles and 2 12-pounder howitzers, which joined the army on the march to Gettysburg. This table excludes the Horse Artillery, 44 3-inch guns, serving with the cavalry. It will be seen that the Artillery Reserve, every gun of which was brought into requisition, bore, as in all the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, its full share, and more, of the losses.
The expenditure of ammunition in the three days amounted to 32,781 rounds, averaging over 100 rounds per gun. Many rounds were lost in the caissons and limbers by explosions and otherwise. The supply carried with the army being 270 rounds per gun, left sufficient to fill the ammunition chests and enable the army to fight another battle. There was for a short time during the battle a fear that the ammunition would give out. This fear was caused by the large and unreasonable demands made by corps commanders who had left their own trains or a portion of them behind, contrary to the orders of the commanding general. In this emergency, the train of the Artillery Reserve, as on so many other occasions, supplied all demands, and proved its great usefulness (Submitted on February 10, 2009, by Craig Swain of Leesburg, Virginia.)
Categories. • War, US Civil •
Credits. This page was last revised on September 15, 2016. This page originally submitted on February 10, 2009, by Craig Swain of Leesburg, Virginia. This page has been viewed 1,084 times since then and 25 times this year. Photos: 1, 2, 3, 4. submitted on February 10, 2009, by Craig Swain of Leesburg, Virginia. 5. submitted on September 15, 2016, by J. Makali Bruton of Querétaro, Mexico.