Communist Chinese Intervention

Communist Chinese Intervention. 3 November 1950 - 24 January 1951.

"We've been looking for the enemy for some time now. We've finally found him. We're surrounded. That simplifies things." , Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller

, The United Nations Offensive had been a story of relentless military success against the North Korean People's Army. The capture of a Chinese soldier on 25 October 1950, however, marked a fundamental change in the war, requiring a new strategy. When the presence of Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) in North Korea was confirmed, there was much debate in the United Nations Command (UNC) and in Washington concerning China's intentions, but the Chinese presence was quickly felt on the battlefield., In late October, Chinese forces had stopped a Republic of Korea (ROK) column advancing on the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. On 2 November, the U.S. 7th Marines relieved the South Koreans and, over the next four days, broke through the Chinese resistance within a few miles of the reservoir, at which point the Chinese broke contact. In the west, the Eighth Army fell back under attack to the Ch'ongch'on River, though the Chinese again broke contact after 6 November. By then three CCF divisions (10,000 men each) were estimated to be in the Eighth Army sector and two CCF divisions in the X Corps zone. Also, UN pilots were for the first time encountering Soviet-made MIG-15 jet fighters., After 6 November a comparative lull lasted for several weeks. Estimates of CCF strength rose through the month, but General MacArthur felt the Chinese were not strong enough to launch an all-out offensive, particularly when North Korea's forces were battered and ineffective. Moreover, MacArthur said, there was no other way to obtain "an accurate measure of enemy strength." He prepared to press on with his plans to reach the Yalu River. General Walker's Eighth Army was to move northward through western and central Korea, while Major General Almond's X Corps was to move from Northeastern Korea to sever enemy lines of communication and support of the Eighth Army., General Walker launched his offensive on 24 November. The next night the enemy launched a fierce counterattack in the mountainous terrain near the central North Korean town of Tokch'on. The X Corps joined the planned attack on 27 November. That evening a second enemy force moving down the Chosin Reservoir struck the 1st Marine Division and elements of the U.S. 7th Division., It was clear that most of the enemy were Chinese, but the surprise was the size of the attacking forces. By November MacArthur had his "accurate measure" of the enemy's strength: the Chinese XIII Army Group, with some 200,000 troops, faced the Eighth Army; the CCF IX Army Group, with 100,000 troops, faced X Corps. Both had slipped into North Korea from Manchuria largely undetected. On the 28th, MacArthur informed Washington that "we face an entirely new war," and the next day he instructed General Walker to withdraw as necessary to escape being enveloped by the Chinese. He also ordered X Corps to pull back into a beachhead at the east coast port of Hungnam, north of Wonsan., The main enemy attack in the Eighth Army zone was directed against the ROK II Corps. When the Chinese broke through the UN line, General Walker committed his reserves, but they failed to stop the repeated wave of enemy troops. Walker first withdrew south across the Ch'ongch'on River, suffering heavy casualties. The U.S. 2d Division fought a delaying action while other units regrouped in defensive positions near the North Korean capital of P'yongyang. On 5 December, the Eighth Army fell back to positions about twenty-five miles south of that city, and by mid-December it had moved below the 38th Parallel to form a defensive perimeter north and east of Seoul. At the same time, MacArthur ordered X Corps to evacuate by sea to Pusan. December thus saw the loss of all UNC territorial gains in North Korea., By this time the UNC included troops from fifteen countries, but the sense of crisis in the command was heightened by the death of General Walker in an auto accident north of Seoul. Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway replaced him, arriving in Korea on 26 December. General Ridgway was determined to maintain the existing line above Seoul, but on 30 December, MacArthur told the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Chinese could drive the UNC out of Korea unless he received a major reinforcement. He proposed air and naval attacks on mainland China and the involvement of Chinese Nationalist forces. None of his demands and proposals were accepted. Washington was not prepared to let the conflict in Korea escalate into a larger war. President Truman's more pressing concern was the global intentions of the Soviet Union. MacArthur was told to stay in Korea if he could but to prepare to withdraw to Japan if necessary., Despite a renewed enemy offensive that started on 31 December and saw the abandonment of Seoul on 4 January 1951, General Ridgway became increasingly convinced that his existing forces were sufficient. He noted that the Chinese did not aggressively push south after marching into Seoul and that North Korean forces ceased their offensive in central and eastern Korea by mid-January. He concluded that a rudimentary logistical system constrained enemy offensive operations to no more than a week or two. Tactically his goal was to "wage a war of maneuver, slashing at the enemy when he withdraws and fighting delaying tactics when he attacks." When General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, visited Korea, he agreed with Ridgway. "As of now," Collins announced on 15 January, "We are going to stay and fight.", AS the third phase of the Korean conflict drew to an end, General MacArthur gave Ridgway unprecedented authority to plan and execute operations in Korea. Ridgway, in turn was poised to return to the offensive.