Battle Plans

Battle Plans. . Early on the morning of May 12, 1863, McPherson, having received Grant's message to move “with all activity," ordered his 17th Corps out of its encampment on the Roach farm, ten miles to the southwest. Once at Raymond he would complete the desired east-west alignment of the Union army for its strike against the railroad that linked Vicksburg and Jackson. Thick clouds of dust enveloped the men as they pushed along the Utica Road, but by mid-morning the vanguard crested the ridge behind you overlooking Fourteenmile Creek. , Meanwhile in Raymond, Brig. Gen. Gregg was unaware of the impending threat because Pemberton's poorly-written order resulted in Col. Wirt Adams' cavalry trotting to Edwards on May 11, rather than to Raymond to support Gregg. So, early on May 12, Gregg sent out a makeshift scouting force composed of state troops and “youths from the neighborhood," who soon returned with a report of about 2,500 to 3,000 Federals approaching on the Utica Road. Gregg had been advised by Lt. Gen. Pemberton that the enemy was marching to Edwards Station, so he surmised that the force to the southwest was probably “a brigade on a marauding exposition" screening the right flank of the main attack on Edwards. Gregg decided to set a trap for this supposed lone brigade by luring it into the cul-de-sac formed by the horseshoe turn of Fourteenmile Creek. The bait was to be the 7th Texas Infantry, posted near the Utica Road bridge at the creek. This regiment was to be the anvil in the classic hammer and anvil tactic. The hammer would be provided by a large regiment, the 3d Tennessee Infantry, 548-strong, followed by the 50th Tennessee Infantry, then the 10th and 30th Tennessee Consolidated Infantry in an en echelon, or step- by-step, attack. Gregg's three cannon were posted 850 yards north of the bridge. The trap was set; however, unbeknownst to Gregg the prey wasn't one brigade; it was six brigades in two divisions.